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This paper investigates whether the real oil price has an impact on the real 
exchange rates of three main oil-exporting countries: Norway, Russia and Saudi 
Arabia.  We create our measure of the real effective exchange rates for Norway 
and Saudi Arabia (1980-2006) and for Russia (1995-2006), testing if real oil 
prices and productivity differentials against 15 OECD countries influence 
exchange rates. In the case of Russia it is possible to establish a positive long-run 
relationship between the real oil price and the real exchange rate. However, we 
find virtually no impact of the real oil price on the real exchange rates of Norway 
and Saudi Arabia.  The diverse exchange rate regimes cannot help in explaining 
the different empirical results on the impact of oil prices across countries, which 
instead may be due to other policy responses, namely the accumulation of net 
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The world economy still runs on oil. Sharp fluctuations in the oil price provoke 
significant shifts in the wealth of nations. The large increase in oil prices since the 
beginning of the new millennium has been associated with the emergence of large 
current account imbalances across the globe. As the current oil shock has proved 
to be more persistent than expected, oil exporters have emerged as the group of 
countries with the largest current account surplus. This has prompted renewed 
interest in the economies of these countries and, in particular, their exchange 
rates, since the latter, at least for some, could contribute to the adjustment of 
global imbalances.  
 
In this study, we focus on the economies of three main oil exporting countries: 
Norway, Russia and Saudi Arabia. In 2005, oil exports accounted for around fifty 
percent of total exports in Norway and Russia and for more than eighty percent of 
total exports in Saudi Arabia. The contribution to domestic production of the oil 
sector ranges from around twenty percent of GDP in Russia, to around one quarter 
in Norway and more than forty percent of GDP in Saudi Arabia. In 2006, these 
three countries recorded a combined current account surplus of around USD 250 
billion, which is around a half of the total current account surplus of oil exporting 
countries and almost one third of the current account deficit in the United States. 
 
In particular, this paper investigates whether the real oil price has an impact on the 
real exchange rates of these three main oil exporting countries.  Indeed, the 
economic literature identified the terms of trade – the relative price of exports to 
imports - as one of the potential determinants of the real exchange rate, which 
may explain long and persistent deviations from a simple Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) equilibrium. In oil exporting countries, the main driver of the terms of trade 
is the oil price. Here, therefore, we take the real oil price as a proxy of the terms 
of trade and examine whether oil price fluctuations affect the real effective 
exchange rate of these three countries. Using quarterly data over the period 1980 - 
2006 for Norway and Saudi Arabia and 1995 – 2006 for Russia, we create our 
measure of the real effective exchange rates and, in addition to real oil prices, we 
control for the possible role of productivity differentials against 15 OECD 
countries in explaining exchange rate movements. Since these countries adopted 
different exchange rate regimes, we also try to understand whether the currency 
arrangement does matter. 
 
Following the literature on time series analysis, we estimate three different models 
based on the different results concerning the order of integration of our time 
series, which indicates whether or not the series tend to revert to a long-term 
mean. Our empirical investigation shows that there is not a “one size fits all” 
model for the real exchange rate for our three countries and that only in Russia is 
it possible to identify a robust long-run relationship between the exchange rate 
and oil prices. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of the productivity 
differential as an explanatory variable, which appears to be an important 
determinant of the real exchange rate in Russia, a transition economy. Due to the 
relatively short sample for Russia, it is necessary to take this conclusion with 
some caution and possibly test it again over a longer time-span in the future. On 
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the contrary, we find no – or at best a very marginal – impact of the real oil price 
on the real exchange rates of Norway and Saudi Arabia. 
 
Overall, it does not seem that the different exchange rate regimes help to explain 
whether or not the relationship between the real oil price and the real exchange 
rate holds in practice. Irrespective of the exchange rate regimes, other factors may 
interfere and neutralise the transmission of shocks to the real exchange rate. These 
include specific policy responses to volatile oil revenues, monetary policy 
interventions modifying the combination of changes in relative prices and the 
nominal exchange rate which are necessary to restore the equilibrium and other 
institutional features. In the case of Norway, the exchange rate regime underwent 
a number of modifications, with full exchange rate flexibility being introduced 
only over the last few years, thus complicating any possible interpretation of the 
impact of these regimes over the long-run. At the same time, over the past decade, 
Norway “sterilised” the impact of higher oil revenues on the domestic economy 
and the real exchange rate through a massive accumulation of net foreign assets. 
In Russia, the nominal flexibility of the rouble has been limited by the 
interventions of the monetary authorities in the foreign exchange market, which 
have been only partially sterilised contributing to a strong expansion of domestic 
money supply and persistent inflationary pressures. As a result, the absorption of 
the positive oil shock by the real exchange rate took place through changes in 
relative prices and not through an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
Finally, in Saudi Arabia, the “sterilisation” of oil revenues, as well as the presence 
of flexible labour markets and price subsidies, may have played an important role 
in breaking the relationship between the oil price and the real exchange rate. In 
conclusion, the exchange rate regime may not matter, but other policies and 
institutional characteristics may account for the different reaction of the real 













The world economy still runs on oil. Sharp fluctuations in the oil price provoke 
significant shifts in the wealth of nations. The large increase in oil prices since the 
beginning of the new millennium has been associated with the emergence of large 
current account imbalances across the globe. As the current oil shock has proved 
to be more persistent than expected, oil exporting countries have emerged as the 
group of countries with the largest current account surplus. This has prompted 
renewed interest in the economies of these countries and, in particular, their 
exchange rates, since the latter, at least for some, could contribute to the 
adjustment of global imbalances
1. Whether the degree of nominal exchange rate 
flexibility of oil exporting countries is appropriate may well depend on the 
behaviour of the real exchange rate over the long run, considering the possibility 
that the latter may in turn be influenced by significant changes in the terms of 
trade. Indeed, the literature has identified the terms of trade as one of the potential 
determinants of the real exchange rate, which may explain long and persistent 
deviations from a simple Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) equilibrium. In oil 
exporting countries, the main driver of the terms of trade is the oil price. In this 
study, therefore, we take the real oil price as a proxy of the terms of trade and 
examine whether oil price fluctuations affect the real effective exchange rate of 
three countries: Norway, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Since these countries adopted 
different exchange rate regimes, we also try to understand whether the currency 
arrangement does matter. 
 
  Our empirical investigation is based on the theoretical framework of 
exchange rate determination developed by Cashin et al. (2004), which in turn 
builds on De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). In this 
framework, an improvement in the terms of trade - the relative price of exports in 
terms of imports - produces an appreciation of the domestic currency. According 
to this model, the economy is composed of two different sectors: one producing 
an exportable good, and the other producing a non-traded good. In this context, a 
positive shock to the terms of trade leads to an increase in wages in the exporting 
sector. Similarly to the dynamics of the Balassa-Samuelson model of exchange 
rate, under the assumption of wage equalization across the two sectors, this 
translates into an increase in wages and prices in the non-traded goods sector and 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
 
Empirically, the relationship between the terms of trade and the real 
exchange rate has been tested and proven in a number of non-energy commodity 
exporters. Amano and van Norden (1995) find that – as expected - the non-energy 
commodity terms of trade has a positive impact on the real exchange rate of 
Canada, even though - unexpectedly - the energy component of the terms of trade 
has a negative impact in spite of Canada being a net energy exporter. Chen and 
Rogoff (2003) detect a strong and stable influence of the US dollar price of non-
                                                 
1 In April 2006, the statement of the Group of Seven (G7) explicitly mentioned oil exporting 
countries in the context of global imbalances. In particular, in the annex to the G7 communiqué, it 
was affirmed that “in oil-producing countries, accelerated investment in capacity, increased 
economic diversification, enhanced exchange rate flexibility in some cases […] will play a critical 
role as part of the multilateral adjustment process”. 
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energy commodity exports on the real exchange rates in Australia and New 
Zealand. Cashin et al. (2004) extend this investigation to a set of 58 developing 
countries, which are commodity exporters. They find evidence of a long-run 
relationship between the real exchange rate and real commodity prices in around 
one third of the countries in their sample.  
 
As mentioned, we take the real oil price as a proxy of the terms of trade in 
oil exporting countries. By definition, in these countries, oil exports account for a 
large share of total exports, thus dominating movements in their terms of trade. 
Baxter and Kouparitsas (2000) study the sources of fluctuations in the terms of 
trade identifying two components: “a goods price effect”, which reflect the fact 
that a country exports and imports different baskets of goods, and “a country price 
effect” due to cross-country differences in the price of a particular class of goods. 
For oil producers, most of the terms of trade variation appears to origin in the 
goods-price effects (around 90 percent), confirming hence the enormous role of 
the price of the petroleum-good in these countries’ relative export prices. 
However, in general, even in major industrialised countries, which have 
diversified import and export structures and are net importers of oil, both changes 
and volatility in the terms of trade are largely driven by changes and volatility in 
oil prices and quantities (see Backus and Crucini, 2000).  
 
The potential role of oil shocks in driving terms of trade movements and 
impacting on exchange rates has already received much attention in the literature. 
Several studies claim the existence of a relationship between oil prices and 
exchange rates in both developed oil importing and oil exporting countries. From 
a theoretical perspective, Krugman (1983) and Golub (1983) were the first to 
develop models in which shifts in oil prices generate wealth transfer effects and 
portfolio reallocations, leading to adjustments in exchange rates to clear asset 
markets. As regards the bilateral exchange rates between two or more oil 
importing countries, the relative propensity to import oil and their respective 
bilateral trade deficits against oil producing countries are the key variables in 
explaining whether a rise in the oil price will lead to an appreciation or 
depreciation of the currency. Amano and van Norden (1998a and 1998b) test 
empirically the Krugman-Golub hypothesis and find evidence of a long-run stable 
relationship between the real effective exchange rate of the US dollar and the oil 
price deflated by the US consumer price index over the post-Bretton Woods 
period. Chaudhuri and Daniel (1998) note that both exchange rates and oil prices 
appear non-stationary over the post-Bretton Woods period, but stationary over the 
very long run. They also find evidence of cointegration between these two 
variables – deflated by producer price indices – over the post Bretton-Woods 
period, concluding that the non-stationarity of the US dollar over this period is 
due to the non-stationarity of the real price of oil. More recently, Chen and Chen 
(2006) have confirmed and extended these results testing for cointegration in a 
panel of G7 countries. 
 
Other empirical studies focused on the exchange rates of oil “exporting” 
countries, where a positive oil shock, in theory, is expected to generate an 
appreciation of the currency over the long-run. Indeed, many empirical studies 
find a significant and positive relationship between the oil price and the real 
exchange rate of oil exporting countries. Koranchelian (2005) and Zalduendo 
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(2006) find that oil prices - as well as productivity differentials - play a significant 
role in determining the equilibrium real effective exchange rate in the case of 
Algeria and Venezuela, respectively. As regards the three countries which are 
studied in this paper, there are a number of studies on Norway and only few 
studies investigating Russia and Saudi Arabia. Evidence concerning the 
Norwegian krone is mixed. Akram (2004) finds a non-linear asymmetric 
relationship between the “nominal” exchange rate of the krone and oil prices. In 
particular, he finds that declines in the oil price lead to a depreciation of the krone 
when oil prices are below a certain threshold. Bergvall (2004) examines the 
determinants of the real exchange rates in Norway and other Nordic countries, 
finding that exogenous terms of trade (real oil price) shocks and supply side 
(productivity) shocks explain most of the long-run variance of the real exchange 
rate in the case of Norway and also Denmark. Spatafora and Stavrev (2003) 
estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate for Russia and find a positive role for 
both the nominal oil price and the productivity differentials. Dibooglu and Aleisa 
(2004) run a vector autoregressive model in first differences for the Saudi Arabian 
economy and show that the Saudi Arabian price level, real exchange rate and 
output are vulnerable to exogenous terms of trade shocks. Finally, Korhonen and 
Juurikkala (2007) estimate the real exchange rate in a panel of nine OPEC 
countries by adopting the empirical methodology in Chen and Chen (2007), 
finding a statistically significant effect of the real price of oil on exchange rates.  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the determinants of real 
exchange rates in a number of different ways. First, we focus on the three major 
oil exporting countries in terms of their current account surplus
2, which are 
therefore relevant for the adjustment of global imbalances. So far, as mentioned 
above, only the case of Norway has been broadly investigated, with mixed results, 
whereas to our knowledge there exist no studies like ours that run a thorough 
analysis of the real exchange rates in these three countries, using a consistent and 
coherent single-equation time-series approach and testing for the potential impact 
of real oil prices. Second, from a methodological perspective, we build our 
measures of the real effective exchange rates and productivity differentials against 
the 15 OECD main trading partners, thus controlling also for the so-called 
Balassa-Samuelson effect and including productivity differentials as a potential 
explanatory variable of the real exchange rate. Third, as most exchange rates are 
near unit–root, we use a strict procedure for testing their stationarity and allow for 
both I(0) and I(1) processes when the results are not unequivocal, following Chen 
and Rogoff (2003). Fourth, as the three countries adopted different exchange rate 
regimes, we try to understand whether these arrangements may account for 
potential differences in the relationship between the real oil price and the real 
exchange rate. In particular, one would expect the relationship between oil prices 
and the real exchange rate to hold in countries where the nominal exchange rate is 
allowed to absorb potential exogenous oil shocks. 
 
In a preview of our main findings, we conclude that only in the case of 
Russia it is possible to establish a positive long-run relationship between the real 
                                                 
2 According to the IMF World Economic Outlook (2006), Russia and Saudi Arabia are the two 
countries with the largest current account, trade balance and oil balance surplus in US dollars 
among the oil exporting countries. Norway has the third largest current account and trade surplus 
and the seventh largest oil surplus. 
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oil price and the real exchange rate. However, we find no – or at best a very 
marginal – impact of the real oil price on the real exchange rates of Norway and 
Saudi Arabia. The adoption of different exchange rate regimes in these countries 
does not help to explain the divergence in these results. The paper is organized as 
follows. In section 2, we describe the statistical characteristics of our data. Section 
3 reports the empirical results. We account for our findings in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 




The economies of Norway, Russia and Saudi Arabia are highly dependent on oil 
revenues. In 2005, oil exports accounted for around fifty percent of total exports 
in Norway and Russia and for more than eighty percent of total exports in Saudi 
Arabia. The contribution to domestic production of the oil sector ranges from 
around twenty percent of GDP in Russia, to around one quarter in Norway and 
more than forty percent of GDP in Saudi Arabia. Following the surge in world oil 
prices since 2000, Norway, Russia and Saudi Arabia have become also major 
actors in the global constellation of external imbalances. In 2006, these three 
countries recorded a combined current account surplus of around USD 250 
billion, which is around a half of the total current account surplus of oil exporting 
countries, as classified by the IMF, and almost one third of the current account 
deficit in the United States. 
 
The three countries in our sample adopted different exchange rate 
arrangements throughout the period under examination. In Norway, the exchange 
rate was subject to limited flexibility, at least until the second half of the 1990s, 
and gained more flexibility only over the past few years. Formally, the regime 
switched from a moving band around the German mark until mid-1982, to a loose 
peg to a basket of currencies until mid-1987 - which was punctuated by a sharp 
depreciation in May 1986 - again to a moving band around the mark until 1990 
and to a peg to the ECU between 1990 and 1992. In 1992, Norway adopted a 
managed floating regime which was kept until 2001, when the authorities 
introduced the inflation targeting regime, which implies the independent floating 
of the krone. In Russia, the flexibility of the exchange rate has been also 
somewhat limited. Between 1995 and 1998, the de jure exchange rate 
arrangement of the rouble was a floating exchange rate with rule-based 
intervention, according to the IMF, although Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) refer to a 
pre-announced crawling band around the US dollar. After the currency and 
financial crisis in the summer of 1998, the IMF de jure classified Russia as a 
floating exchange rate regime. However, since 1999, the Russian authorities de 
facto have been targeting the real exchange rate - with a basket of currencies 
mainly composed by the US dollar and the euro – stabilising the nominal effective 
exchange rate and leaning against real appreciation. Finally, in Saudi Arabia, the 
exchange rate regime is a rigid conventional peg throughout the period under 
examination. The riyal has been de facto pegged to the US dollar since 1981 – 
10
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The aim of this paper is to test a relationship between the real effective exchange 
rate, the real oil price and the productivity differential in three oil exporting 
countries. For this purpose, we use the model developed by Cashin et al. (2004) 
for commodity dependent countries (see Appendix A for a description of the 
Norway and Saudi Arabia for a total of 106 observations. Due to lack of reliable 
data, the sample for Russia starts only in 1995 and ranges from 1995Q1 to 
2006Q2 period, for a total of 46 observations. Following the IMF methodology, 
we create our own measure of the real effective exchange rate (REER), 
calculating a trade-weighted geometric average of bilateral exchange rates vis-à-
vis trading partners’ currencies multiplied by the differential between the 
domestic consumer price index and the trade weighted foreign consumer price 
index
4. Differently from the IMF, the weights are based on the total trade against 
the main 15 OECD trading partners and averaged over non-overlapping five-year 
windows during the period 1980 – 2005
5. The set of trading partners is smaller 
than in the IMF case but our index better captures changes in the direction of 
trade, owing to more frequent changes in the weights, and, moreover, includes oil 
exports
6. Crucially, by calculating our own weights, we may apply the same 
weights to calculate both the real effective exchange rate and the productivity 
differential variable, allowing for a better comparison of these two variables. Data 
of consumer price indices and bilateral exchange rates are from the International 
                                                 
3 Even in this rather straightforward case, the de jure classification does not coincide with the de 
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CPI i and CPI j denote the consumer price indices of the home country and the trading partner, 
correspondingly, and E i and E j stand for the bilateral exchange rates with respect to the US dollar 
(measured as units of US dollar for a unit of domestic currency) for the home and foreign country, 
respectively. Wij indicates the relative weight of the bilateral trade between the home country, i, 
and the foreign country, j, on the total trade of the home country. The index j runs from 1 to 15, as 
we consider only the 15 main OECD trading partners of Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. An 
increase in the real effective exchange rate indicates real appreciation. See Zanello and Desruelle 
(1997) for more details on the construction of real effective exchange rates. 
5  See Table “Trade eights” in Appendix C. The list of trading partners includes Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States of America. We consider only these 15 countries 
as i) they constitute more than 80%, around 50% and more than 60% of the trade between 
Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia and the world, correspondingly; ii) all of them are developed 
countries for which we may obtain reliable data. In order to combine the series based on different 
trade weights we use the chain rule  1 1 − − = t t t t Y Y X Z , where t denotes time period, X is the series 
comprising the last five years, Y is the series using the trade weights of the following five years, 
and Z is the combined series. 
6 Zanello and Desruelle (1997) and recently Bayoumi et al. (2005) from the IMF consider only 
trade in manufactures, non-oil primary commodities and tourism services. In addition weights are 
changed only every ten years.   
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2.2. Data description and discussion 
theoretical framework). The data sample ranges from 1980Q1 to 2006Q2, for  
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF and trade weights are calculated from the 
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) of IMF.  
 
The trade-weighted relative productivity differential variable (PROD) is 
constructed using the same methodology and trade weights as in the real effective 
exchange rate index. For Norway and Russia, and the OECD trading partners 
productivity is defined as the seasonally adjusted real gross domestic product 
(GDP) relative to the number of people employed. GDP and employment are 
provided by the OECD Economic Outlook Database for most of the considered 
countries. For Russia we use data from Global Insight/World Market Monitor. 
Unfortunately, in the case of Saudi Arabia it is not possible to create a well 
behaved variable for the productivity differential due to lack of consistent data on 
employment and quarterly GDP. For this reason, the productivity differential does 
not enter into the regression for the real exchange rate of Saudi Arabia. In a 
similar fashion, we constructed an additional control variable, real interest rate 
differentials between Norway – the only country where short and long term 
interest rates were available across the whole sample – and the main OECD 




The real price of oil (ROP) is calculated as the US dollar price of crude oil 
deflated by the IMF index of the unit value of world manufactured exports
8 which 
is often used in the literature as a proxy of the import prices of commodity 
exporters (see for instance Deaton and Miller 1996 and Cashin et al. 2004). As a 
nominal oil price we use the price of the UK Brent barrel for Norway, the Urals 
for Russia, and the Dubai for Saudi Arabia
9. All variables are transformed in 
logarithms.  













80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Terms of trade
UK Brent (in real terms)
 
Figure 1. The relationship between the terms of trade of Norway and the real price of UK Brent 
                                                 
7 For Russia and Saudi Arabia, only money market rates were available for a large part of the 
sample, but not long term rates. We constructed real interest rate differentials also for these short-
term rates and tested for their relevance in explaining real exchange rates over the period for which 
data were available. However, we did not find any significant relationship. Results are available 
upon request. 
8 The variable is a unit value index of exports from 20 industrial countries calculated in US dollar 
terms. 
9 In any case, these three oil prices are very similar with a correlation coefficient of 0.99.  
12
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Norway is the only country in our sample for which a measure of the terms of 
trade is available. This allows us to assess to what extent the terms of trade of an 
oil exporting country are dominated by changes in oil prices. In Figure 1 we plot 
the terms of trade ratio for Norway - obtained from the Bank for International 
Settlement - against our measure of the real UK Brent oil price. The visual 
analysis confirms that the two series generally co-move across the whole sample 
and the real oil price is a very good proxy for the terms of trade of Norway. In 
particular, the degree of synchronisation of the two series is remarkably high since 
1986
10.  For our purposes, the use of real oil prices instead of the terms of trade 
presents an additional advantage as it eliminates any potential problem of 
endogeneity in the relationship between the terms of trade and the real exchange 





































































































   
Figure 2 a) Norwegian real effective exchange rate and real UK Brent oil price; b) Russian real 
effective exchange rate and real Urals oil price; c) Saudi Arabian real effective exchange rate and 
real Dubai oil price.  
                                                 
10 The correlation coefficient is equal to 0.85 over the whole sample and increases to 0.95 after 
1986. 
11 Granger causality tests confirm that the real oil price is exogenous to the real exchange rate.  
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In Figure 2 we compare the real effective exchange rates of Norway, Russia and 
Saudi Arabia against the real UK Brent price, real Urals price and real Dubai oil 
price, correspondingly. Only in the case of Russia, a preliminary inspection shows 
evidence of co-movement between the real exchange rate and the real oil price, 
which is particularly tight after the 1998 currency crisis. In the case of Norway, it 
is possible to identify only a positive common trend in the real oil price and the 
exchange rate since 1999. In the case of Saudi Arabia, there is a downward trend 
in both the real exchange rate and the real oil price since 1986. This relationship, 
however, is rather loose and breaks down with the latest upswing in the oil price 
since 1999, which is not followed by an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Actually, since 2002, the riyal, which is pegged to the US dollar, depreciates in 
real terms whereas the oil price continues to increase, resulting in a negative 
relationship between the two variables.  
 
 
Following the descriptive analysis of the data, in this subsection we discuss the 
statistical features of our time series. In particular, the identification of the order 
of integration of the real exchange rate is a delicate task, as exchange rates usually 
display near-unit root behaviour. In general, the hypothesis of stationarity of real 
exchange rates is accepted over very long samples and rejected in shorter samples 
over the post-Bretton Woods period (Taylor 2003). The behaviour of our series 
indeed shows that both stationary and non-stationary data-generating processes 
may characterise the real exchange rate. In Figure 2, the time path of the real 
exchange rate of Norway could imply the existence of an underlying stationary 
process, as the krone seems to fluctuate around a long term average, whereas the 
exchange rates of Russia and Saudi Arabia seem subject to long-lasting shocks.  
 
In Table 1 we present the results of the formal unit root analysis of our 
series, applying three different tests.  As unit root tests have low power and may 
fail to distinguish between a unit root process and a near-unit root process, we 
compare the results of the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with the 
null of non-stationarity and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test 
with the null of stationarity. In addition, we run a third test allowing for structural 
breaks in the series following Lanne et al. (2002), since these breaks may modify 
the outcome of standard unit root tests
12.  
 
Overall, the unit root analysis of the real exchange rates produces results 
which are generally in line with our preliminary inspection. The three different 
tests produce coherent results for the real exchange rate of Norway, which appears 
to be a stationary process. The stationarity of the Norwegian krone is a rather 
unusual result for a currency with exchange rate flexibility - although to a certain 
extent limited in a large part of the sample - in a post-Bretton Wood sample. 
However, this result is consistent with other recent studies such as Akram 
                                                 
12 All unit root tests include a constant. We also tested for the presence of a deterministic time 
trend in our series, which however has been rejected at standard significance levels. Tests on the 
first differences of the variables are not shown, but they all reject the hypothesis of the presence of 
a unit root. We therefore conclude that there are no I(2) variables in our sample.  
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2.3. Unit root analysis   
(2006)
13. Unit root tests also produce consistent results for the real exchange rate 
of Saudi Arabia, which appears to have a unit root in our sample
14.  However, for 
the real exchange of Russia, the three tests lead to different conclusions about the 
data generating process. The KPSS cannot reject the null of stationarity for the 
Russian rouble. In contrast, the ADF test cannot reject the null of non-stationarity, 
indicating the presence of a unit root. The real exchange of Russia has certainly a 
structural break in 1998 and the test of Lanne et al. (2002), which accounts for 
this break, also cannot reject the null of non-stationarity. Therefore, we conclude 
that the real exchange rate of Russia has most likely a unit root. However, since 
the results for Russia are not unequivocal and we have to model data with near 
unit root behaviour, we follow Chen and Rogoff (2003) and consider also the 
possibility that the series for the rouble is stationary. 
 
The results from unit root tests of the other variables, productivity 
differentials and real oil prices, are easier to interpret. The productivity 
differentials that we have created for Norway and Russia are clearly non-
stationary and, therefore we need to use them in first differences when regressing 
stationary variables or use them in levels with other non-stationary variables. The 
same conclusion applies to the real oil prices. 
 
Table 1. Unit root tests 
lag length KPSS ADF Lanne et al.
H0: x ~ I(0) H0: x ~ I(1) H0: x ~ I(1)
Real exchange rate
Norway 0 0.42 3.46** 3.15**
Russia 0 0.17 2.77 2.64
Saudi Arabia 0 1.71** 1.58 1.09
Productivity differential
Norway 1 2.02** 0.49 0.35
Russia 0 0.90** 0.50 0.66
Real oil price
UK Brent 3 0.52** 1.88 1.41
URAL 5 0.82** 0.24 0.21
Dubai 3 0.53** 1.80 1.23
 
Notes: The table reports the absolute value of the statistics for the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 
(KPSS) test for the null of stationarity in the series; the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for the null of 
non-stationarity, and the Lanne et al. test for the null of non-stationarity allowing for structural breaks. The 
lag length for the ADF and Lanne et al. tests was chosen according to the Schwartz criterion. For the KPSS 
test we calculate the number of lags according to the following formula for quarterly data: 4(T/100)^1/4. 
Asterisks ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 5 percent level. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
Following the literature on time series analysis, after having checked for the order 
of integration, we estimate three different models based on the different results 
                                                 
13 Akram (2006) explores in a vector error correction model the convergence to purchasing power 
parity of the real effective exchange rate of Norway between 1970 and 2003 by disentangling it 
into its three components: the nominal exchange rate, domestic consumer price index and the 
weighted foreign consumer price index. He notes that deviations are primarily eliminated by 
adjustments in the nominal exchange rate within 1.5 years. 
14 The results for Saudi Arabia are in line with Dibooglu and Aleisa (2004). 
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concerning the underlying data-generating process. First, under the assumption of 
stationarity of the real exchange rate of Norway - and also Russia - we test 
whether the change in real oil prices and productivity differentials may help to 
explain the level of the real exchange rate. Second, under the assumption of non-
stationarity of the real exchange rate of Russia and Saudi Arabia, we search for a 
long-run relationship with the real oil prices and the productivity differential, 
testing for cointegration and estimating a vector error correction model if we find 
evidence of a common stochastic trend. Finally, if we do not find evidence of 
cointegration among non-stationary series, we consider the possibility of an 




3.1. REER as a stationary process 
 
The first step of the empirical analysis is to test for a simple linear relationship 
between the level of the real effective exchange rate and the first differences of 
the real oil price. We are therefore testing whether the real exchange rate reacts to 
changes in oil price inflation. We also included the relative productivity 
differential as an explanatory variable (in first differences), but we do not report 
results of these estimations as the coefficients were always statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, we controlled for the impact of real interest rate 
differentials vis-à-vis OECD trading partners on the exchange rate of Norway. 
Also this control variable does not appear to be significant across the whole 
sample, but only over a sub-sample starting in the first half of the 1990s when 
Norway adopted a floating exchange rate regime (see Appendix B)
16. Therefore, 
the equation that has been estimated and for which we report the results is the 
following: 
 
t j j t j t t ROP REER const REER ε γ ρ + ∆ + + = ∑ − −1 . 
 
where REERt is the log of the real effective exchange rate at time t, and ∆ROPt is 
the first difference of the log of the real oil prices at time t. We test for both the 
contemporaneous and lagged impact of the change in real oil prices on the 
exchange rate. Table 2 reports the results of these simple OLS regressions for 
Norway and Russia, the two countries where we concluded – or could not exclude 
– that the real effective exchange rate is stationary. Results in Table 2 are 
                                                 
15  See also Hamilton (1994), p. 561-562, for a discussion on the cures for spurious regressions.  
16 In particular, we find that the lagged coefficient for the real (long-term) interest rate differential 
is positive, very small and statistically significant since 1993Q1, but not in the preceding period. 
These results for Norway are broadly in line with Akram (2003), who estimates various models for 
the exchange rate of the krone between 1972 and 2001. He confirms that the purchasing power 
parity model holds well for the krone over the long-run and that deviations from equilibrium are 
mainly corrected through changes in the nominal exchange rate. Indeed, he finds that both real oil 
prices and real interest rate differentials have low explanatory power for the real exchange rate. 
Therefore, he uses “nominal” interest rate differentials in order to gauge short-term movements in 
the “nominal” exchange rate. Indeed, other studies, such as Kloster at al. (2003) and Naug (2003) 
provide evidence that positive nominal interest rate differentials in Norway contributed to the 
nominal appreciation of the krone between mid-2000 and the beginning of 2003. Overall, in the 
case of Norway, interest rate differentials seem to be a significant potential explanatory variable 
only for short or medium term movements in the nominal exchange rate. 
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generally robust to the usual misspecification tests
17. Only in the case of Russia 
are the residuals not normally distributed, even after the inclusion of a dummy 
variable accounting for the Russian crisis in 1998, but this depends on some 




Table 2. Norway and Russia. Real effective exchange rates and real oil prices. 
Ordinary least squares 
REER (-1)  0.807***   0.788***  0.874***  0.866***
[0.061] [0.059] [0.054] [0.056]
D(Real oil price)  0.024 0.013 -0.068 -0.025
[0.017] [0.016] [0.054] [0.063]
(-1) 0.023 -0.159**
[0.018] [0.069]
(-2) -0.029*    0.069
[0.016] [0.068]
(-3)  0.015 -0.043
[0.017] [0.049]
(-4) -0.043***  0.120**
[0.015] [0.053]
const. 0.900*** 0.992***  0.641** 0.678**
[0.284] [0.275]  [0.265] [0.274]
Dummies
Adj. R-sq 0.64 0.64 0.93 0.94
No. obs.





Notes: All variables are in logs. The dependent variable is the real effective exchange rates of Norway and 
Russia. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in square brackets. Regressions for 
Russia include spike dummies at 1998q3.  Asterisks ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 
percentage levels. 
 
In Norway, the results show that there is no contemporaneous impact of 
the change in real oil prices on the real exchange rate. The coefficient is indeed 
positive, but very small and not significantly different from zero. Moreover, 
looking at the lagged impact of changes in oil prices, we find that (i) some of the 
lags of the change in real oil prices are significant and enter with the negative 
signs and (ii) negative and positive signs alternate, with a greater impact of 
negative effects. Results for Russia are partially similar. As in the case of Norway, 
the contemporaneous effect of the change in real oil prices is not significantly 
                                                 
17  The presence of serial correlation is rejected by Lijung-Box Q-statistics up to 20 lags. We 
account for some minor heteroskedasticity in the residuals reporting White robust standard errors. 
Chow, CUSUM and CUSUM-squared tests exclude structural breaks, apart from a break in 
1998Q3 in Russia due to the currency crisis. The possibility of an incorrect functional form is 
tested and rejected by the standard RESET test. The normality of standardized residuals is tested 
through the usual Jarque-Bera test. 
18 Eliminating the first four quarters of data in the case of Russia, we obtain normal residuals and 
eliminate residual heteroskedasticity, however the main results do not change. For consistency 
reasons, we prefer to show the results with the complete sample. 
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different from zero, however, this time it enters with the negative sign. Again, we 
find an alternation in the sign of the coefficients for the lagged impact. The real 
exchange rate tends to depreciate over the very short run, as the coefficient for the 
first lag of the change in the real oil price is negative and significantly different 
from zero, but then appreciates after one year, as the coefficient for the fourth lag 
is of similar magnitude, positive and significantly different from zero. 
 
A tentative interpretation of these results is the following. When real oil 
price inflation accelerates, this is interpreted as good news for an oil exporting 
country and may have a positive immediate impact on the nominal exchange rate, 
if this is flexible. However, the increase in oil prices fuels domestic inflation in 
the main trading partners of oil exporters, which are net oil importers. As a result, 
the price of the basket of consumer goods in the main trading partners relative to 
the oil exporting country tends to increase and the CPI-based real exchange rate of 
the oil exporting country tends to depreciate. Depending on the relative strength 
of changes in the nominal exchange rate and changes in the relative price levels, 
over the short run, the change in real oil prices may have either a negative or 
positive impact on the real exchange rate of oil exporters
19.  
 
In particular, in the case of Russia, on the basis of the visual analysis in 
section 2, we could have expected a closer positive relationship between the two 
variables. Taking into account that there is evidence that the real exchange rate of 
Russia is an I(1) process, we therefore conclude that the change in the real oil 
price does not help to explain the level of the real exchange rate of the rouble and, 
in this case, it is necessary to proceed with the analysis of a potential cointegrating 
relationship between the level of the two variables. This is indeed the purpose of 
the next section. 
 
3.2. REER as a non-stationary process 
 
The second step of the analysis is to search for a potential cointegrating 
relationship between exchange rates and oil prices when the real exchange rate is 
indeed non-stationary as in the case of Saudi Arabia and, most likely, Russia. 
Evidence of cointegration would imply that the real oil price can adequately 
capture all the permanent innovations in the real effective exchange rate. For 
Russia, we also consider the role of the productivity differential in the adjustment 
of the real effective exchange rate to its equilibrium level, which may be 
particularly important for a transition country that has been subject to supply 
shocks. We first determine the number of cointegrating relations for Russia and 
Saudi Arabia. If we find evidence of cointegration, we then estimate a vector error 
correction model (VECM) and, in addition, we run some tests for weak 
exogeneity in order to control for the causal link running from oil prices to the 
exchange rate. In case of no cointegration, we estimate the model in first 
differences.  
 
In order to determine the exact number of long-run relationships among 
the variables, it is first necessary to specify a vector autoregression (VAR) model.  
                                                 
19 This is not in conflict with the theory, which assumes a positive impact of the real oil price on 
the real exchange rate. The positive impact should, presumably, emerge over the medium to long-
run, once in particular domestic prices are allowed to adjust in the oil exporting country. 
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The lag order of the VAR model for each country has been chosen according to 
the Akaike or the Schwartz information criteria, after having checked for the 
absence of residual serial autocorrelation
20. In the case of Russia, we account for 
the financial and currency crisis in August 1998 by including a break dummy. We 
specify the models for the two countries with a constant term in the cointegrating 
relation only, thus, not allowing for a linear trend
21.  After having specified the 
VAR model, we run two different tests in order to determine the cointegration 
rank of our systems of equations, which corresponds to the number of 
independent long-run stable relationships. The first test – the small sample 
corrected Johansen trace* test (Johansen 2000, 2002) – is a likelihood ratio test, 
which computes the Bartlett correction factor thus giving a better approximation 
of the finite sample distribution of the statistic. As a robustness check, we run 
another test, the Zt* test of Gregory and Hansen (1996), which extends the 
standard Philipps-Oularis (1990) Zt test for cointegration by allowing for 
structural shift of unknown timing in the cointegrating relationship. 
 
Table 3. Russia and Saudi Arabia. Cointegration tests for real exchange rates and 
real oil prices. 
Zt* test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
r=0 r≤1r ≤2r = 0
Russia without PROD 44.52** 11.07 -5.62**
including PROD 64.65** 31.95** 11.85 -5.94**
Saudi Arabia 7.69 3.23 -4.46
                  Trace* test
Notes: Columns (1), (2) and (3) provide the results for the small sample corrected Johansen trace test and (4) 
reports the Gregory and Hansen Zt* test. The critical values at 5% level for the Gregory and Hansen Z*t test 
are -4.61 and -4.92 for models with one and two regressors, respectively. Asterisks ** denote significance at 
5% level.    
 
Table 3 presents the results of the two cointegration tests for the real 
effective exchange rate, the real oil price and, in the case of Russia, the 
productivity differential
22. The table reports the test statistics and their statistical 
significance at the usual 5 percent level, under different null hypotheses about the 
cointegrating rank r. In columns (1) and (4), we test the null of no cointegration 
(r=0) against the hypothesis of at least one cointegrating relation for the two 
Russian specifications and the model for Saudi Arabia. Columns (2) and (3) show 
                                                 
20 The Schwartz information criterion has been preferred as it is more parsimonious in the lag 
structure. However, the increase in efficiency of this criterion comes at the cost of a higher 
probability of serial correlation in the residuals. We opted for the Akaike criteria and a richer lag 
structure when it was necessary to eliminate residual serial correlation. We always obtained well-
behaved residuals, except for Russia in the specification including the relative productivity 
differential, where the hypothesis of normality has been rejected.  The VAR including the real oil 
price and real effective exchange rate in Saudi Arabia was specified with four lags. For Russia, an 
asymmetric structure of up to four lags has been chosen for the three endogenous variables – real 
effective exchange rate, relative productivity, and real oil price – excluding the insignificant lags. 
21 As discussed in the section concerning the unit root analysis, there is no evidence of 
deterministic trends in our series. 
22 As noted in section 2.1, there are no available data to measure productivity in Saudi Arabia. 
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the trace* test results for the hypotheses of  1 ≤ r  against  2 ≥ r and  2 ≤ r  against 
r>2, correspondingly.  Only for Russia can we find at least one cointegrating 
relation in both specifications, since the null of no cointegration is always rejected 
at the 5 percent significance level
23. However, according to the tests, in Saudi 




Indication of cointegration is a prerequisite for estimating the model in an error 
correction form. This procedure allows us to distinguish between stationarity 
created by linear combinations of the I(1) variables and stationarity created by 
differencing. Only in the case of Russia did we find evidence of cointegration, 
thus only for this country we continued specifying and estimating a vector error 




1 1 t j j t j t t t y D y y ε + ∆ Γ + Φ + Π = ∆ ∑ = − −  
where 
T
t t t t ROP PROD REER y , , = is a three or two-dimensional column vector 
of endogenous variables, depending on whether we included or excluded the 
productivity variable.  t D  is a vector of deterministic exogenous variables (e.g. 
constant terms, intervention dummies),  t ε  is the error term, and ∆ is the 
difference operator.  j Γ  is a matrix of the short-run dynamics, for which we 
consider up to three lags in differences;  γ α ′ = Φ  consists of the coefficients for 
the deterministic terms. The number of cointegrating relationships corresponds to 
the rank of the matrix Π, the latter taking the form  β α ′ = Π . 
T
ROP PROD REER α α α α , , = describes an adjustment matrix, which shows the speed at 
which each endogenous variable reverts to its equilibrium level, and β is the 
matrix of cointegrating vectors, implying that some linear combination of the 
vector series  t iy β′  is stationary for some non-zero vector  i β .  
 
In Table 4, we report the long-run parameters of the estimated system 
given by the matrixΠ after normalizing by the coefficient of the real effective 
exchange rate:   
   
( ), ~ ~ ~ ~
1 3 1 2 1 const ROP PROD REER t t t REER γ β β α + + + − − −  
 
                                                 
23  The trace* test indicates two cointegrating relations for Russia in the augmented model 
including real oil price and relative productivity differential. However, one should take this result 
with caution as some of the standard residual assumptions have not been satisfied in this 
specification. Furthermore, trace tests tend to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in small 
samples. Johansen (2002) shows that as long as the number of parameters per observation, kn/T 
(with k equal to the number of VAR lags, n to the number of endogenous variables and T to the 
length of the sample), is less than 0.20, the test will give robust results. However, when using three 
variables, we obtain the value of 0.26 for the kn/T ratio, which is above the threshold for reliable 
estimates and may indicate the presence of small-sample bias. Thus, it seems preferable to use 
only one cointegrating vector, as the result is more robust. 
24  It is worth noting that if we cut the sample in 2001 at the onset of the latest oil price upswing 
which preceded the start of the US dollar depreciation, the results for Saudi Arabia change and we 
are then able to detect the presence of cointegration between the real exchange rate of the riyal and 
the real oil price.  
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1 ~ − = REER REER REER β α α , 
1 ~ − = REER i i β β β , and 
1 ~ − = REER γβ γ . The results clearly 
show that the Russian rouble could indeed be classified as an “oil currency”, since 
the elasticity of the real exchange rate to the oil price over the long-run is, as 
expected, positive, relatively large and highly significant
25. Whenever 
international oil prices double in value, the real exchange rate appreciates by 30 to 
55 percent. The coefficient for productivity differential is also positive and 
significant. If the relative productivity differential doubles the real exchange rate 
is expected to almost double as well. Thus, in Russia, the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect seems to play an important role in driving the real effective exchange rate 
along with the real oil price, with the coefficient of the latter remaining positive 
and significant also in the second augmented specification. This is not surprising 
as Russia is a transition economy on its way to catch up with its developed trading 
partners. Therefore, one should expect the productivity growth in Russian tradable 
sector to be higher compared to foreign countries, thus increasing the domestic 
relative price of non-tradables and leading to an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate.    
 
Table 4. Russia. Vector error correction model of the real exchange rate 






Error correction (alpha) -0.375*** -0.528***
[0.050] [0.070]
Half-life of deviations 1.5Qs 1Q
No. obs. 46 46
Sample period 95Q1- 06Q2 95Q1 - 06Q2
 
Notes: Asterisks *** denote significance at 1% level. Standard errors are given in square brackets. 
The half-life of deviations is calculated by the following formula: ln (0.5) / ln (1- |alpha| ). 
 
Besides identifying the cointegrating vector, it is important to control for 
the causal relationship between the variables. If a variable is weakly exogenous 
when estimating the elements of the cointegrating vector, then the corresponding 
element of α (the speed of adjustment of this variable to the long-run equilibrium 
level) will be zero. Therefore weak exogeneity of the real exchange rate (the real 
oil price or the relative productivity differential) can be tested by testing the null 
of  0 = REER α  ( 0 = ROP α  or  0 = PROD α ). The test statistic asymptotically distributes as 
a
2 χ . The rejection of the null of weak exogeneity for one particular variable 
                                                 
25  In order to check whether our model is well specified we test whether the assumptions of 
parameter constancy are holding in both models. Therefore, we estimate the models recursively, as 
suggested by Dennis et al. (2005), and perform two main tests, fluctuation test of the eigenvalues 
of the cointegrated vectors and recursively calculated trace test statistic. Both tests perform 
remarkably well, thus accepting the null hypothesis of parameter stability. 
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implies that this variable adjusts in response to deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium. In our case, one would expect the real effective exchange rate to be 
endogenous, and the real oil price and the productivity differential to be weakly 
exogenous to the system. This hypothesis is indeed supported by the empirical 
evidence, since the null of weak exogeneity is strongly rejected by the test only 
for the real exchange rate and, instead, is not rejected for the real oil price and the 
productivity differential (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Russia. Test of weak exogeneity 
 Null hypothesis: Including productivity
   α (REER) = 0 26.09** 10.95**
   α (ROP) = 0 1.72 0.00
   α (PROD) = 0 0.23
 
Notes: The table shows the test statistic for the null of weak exogeneity against the alternative of endogeneity. 
Asterisks ** denote rejection of the null at the 5% significance level. 
 
The coefficient REER α , negative and highly significant, represents the error-
correction term in the system. From its value – 0.375 in the model without 
productivity and 0.528 in the model with productivity – it is possible to derive the 
half-life of deviations from the equilibrium following exogenous shocks to the 
real exchange rate. In this case, the Russian rouble needs only between one and 
one and half quarters to dissipate half of the shock, depending on whether the 
model includes or excludes productivity differentials, respectively
26. This is a 
remarkably rapid adjustment when compared to standard PPP models estimating 
half-life of shocks to the real exchange rate of more than three years in industrial 
countries. We are going to discuss the implications of this result in greater details 
in the next section.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to complete the analysis of the real exchange rate in 
Saudi Arabia. In this case, the cointegration tests in Table 3 did not indicate any 
long-run stationary relationship between the real exchange rate of the riyal and oil 
prices. However, this does not exclude the possibility of a relationship between 
the two variables. However, since the variables are integrated of order one, it is 
necessary to use their first differences in order to avoid spurious regressions. 
Table 6 reports the results of the regression: 
 
t j j t j t ROP const REER ε γ + ∆ + = ∆ ∑ − . 
 
The equation has been estimated through ordinary least squares, 
accounting for all usual misspecification tests.  There is some evidence of a 
positive impact of the change in real oil prices on the change in the real exchange 
rate after two quarters. However, the magnitude of this impact is very small (0.06) 
and the change in oil prices explains only a tiny part of variation in the real 
                                                 
26 It is possible to compute the half-life of deviations of the real exchange rate as a response to 
exogenous shocks of shocks according to the following formula:  ( ) ( ) REER α − 1 ln 5 . 0 ln . 
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exchange rate, with an adjusted R-squared equal to 0.03 (see second column in 
Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Saudi Arabia. Real exchange rate and real oil price in first differences. 
Ordinary least squares 






Constant  -0.009**  -0.008**
[0.004] [0.004]
Adj. R-sq 0.00 0.03
No. obs. 106 106
Sample period 1980Q1 - 2006Q2 1980Q1 - 2006Q2  
Notes. The dependent variable is the real effective exchange rate of Saudi Arabia in first differences. 
Standard errors are reported in square brackets.  Asterisks ** denote significance at 5% level. 
 
 
4. Accounting for the findings 
 
The empirical investigation of the relationship between oil prices and the 
exchange rate produced mixed results. In this section, we attempt to summarise 
these results, elaborate their implications in terms of the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) theory and account for the institutional features that may help to explain 
different results across our three countries.    
 
First, it is evident that there is not a “one size fits all” model for the real 
exchange rate for our three countries and that only in Russia is it possible to 
identify a robust long-run relationship between the exchange rate and oil prices. In 
Russia, there is strong evidence of non-stationarity of the real exchange rate once 
one accounts for the structural break in the series in 1998. The cointegration 
analysis finds evidence of a long-run relationship between the real exchange rate 
and real oil prices, which is robust to the inclusion of productivity differentials as 
an additional explanatory variable. The productivity differential relative to the 
main OECD trading partners plays a significant role in the determination of the 
rouble real effective exchange rate, thus, accounting for the Balassa-Samulson 
effect, a common feature of exchange rates in transition economies. In the case of 
Norway, the real exchange rate is stationary and changes in the real oil price have 
only a very marginal impact after a few lags. The interpretation of the significant 
negative sign of some of the lags is not straightforward, therefore raising doubts 
about the robustness of this relationship. Finally, in Saudi Arabia, the real 
exchange rate is not stationary, but does not share any common stochastic trend 
with the real oil price. A model in first differences, estimated through ordinary 
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least squares, detects a very small positive impact of the change in the real oil 
price on the change in the real exchange rate. Considering the small value of this 
parameter, the economic implications of this result do not seem particularly 
meaningful. 
 
Second, the PPP puzzle – i.e. the high degree of persistence of shocks to 
the real exchange rate – is absent in two out of our three countries: Norway and 
Russia
27. If we estimate a standard autoregressive model of order one, AR(1), of 
the real exchange rate, we may calculate the so called half-life of deviations from 
PPP measuring how many periods the real exchange rate would need to absorb 
half of an exogenous shock, according to the formula:  ρ ln ) 5 . 0 ln(  , where rho is 
the AR(1) parameter. This coefficient is rather low in the case of Norway, around 
0.80, slightly higher in the case of Russia once the 1998 crisis is accounted for, 
0.88, and finally approaching the unit root in the case of Saudi Arabia, 0.98. 
Correspondingly, the speed of reversion of the real exchange rate to its long-run 
mean, as measured by the half-life of deviations, is relatively fast in the case of 
Norway, only three quarters, slower in Russia, around one and a half year, and 
very slow in Saudi Arabia, more than six years. It is worth noting that the half-life 
in Norway and Russia is much smaller than the consensus estimates of three to 
five years for the real exchange rates of industrial countries (see Taylor, 2003). In 
addition, in the case of Russia, we have been able to specify a well-behaved 
vector error correction model and compute a speed of adjustment of only three to 
five months, when including oil prices and productivity differentials. In other 
terms, by controlling for the influence of real oil prices and productivity on the 
real exchange rate, the persistence of real exchange rate shocks in Russia 
decreases from 18 to less than five months. 
 
Third, we wonder whether the exchange rate regime may help us explain 
the different results of the empirical analysis. We already noted that the three 
countries adopted diverse exchange rate arrangements, with Norway and Russia 
granting some more flexibility compared with Saudi Arabia, which has anchored 
the riyal to the US dollar since the 1980s (see section 2.1). However, the 
implications of these regimes for the actual behaviour and volatility of the 
nominal effective exchange rate are rather surprising. Figure 3 shows the (log) 
nominal effective exchange rate of the three countries. Contrary to what one 
would have expected, the Norwegian krone is more stable than the Saudi riyal
28. 
Indeed, for most of the 1980s and 1990s, Norway targeted the German mark and 
then the ECU, therefore stabilising the nominal exchange rate against its main 
trading partners. The relative stability of the nominal effective exchange rate 
translates into a relative stability of the real effective exchange rate around a long-
run mean, thus, generating the stationarity of the latter, as oil price shocks do not 
seem to matter. On the contrary, the peg of the Saudi riyal to the US dollar does 
not reflect the direction of trade of Saudi Arabia. The United States is indeed an 
important trading partner of Saudi Arabia, but accounts for only 14 to 17 percent 
of Saudi Arabia’s total trade (see table in Appendix C). As a result, the nominal 
                                                 
27 Rogoff (1996) provides a succinct and effective description of the PPP puzzle: “How can one 
reconcile the enormous short-term volatility of real exchange rates with the extremely slow rate at 
which shocks appear to damp out?”. 
28 The coefficient of variation – the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean – of the Saudi riyal, 
2.9%, is twice as large as that of the Norwegian krone, 1.4%. 
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effective exchange rate of the Saudi riyal reflects the fluctuation of the US dollar - 
to which it is pegged - against the currencies of the other main trading partners. In 
Saudi Arabia, the real effective exchange rate follows the non-stationary path of 
the US dollar real rate and is not influenced by the oil price. 
 
 
Finally, Figure 3 shows that the nominal effective exchange rate of Russia 
did not appreciate after the 1998 crisis and did not react to the upswing in the oil 
price from the trough in 1999. The relative nominal flexibility of the rouble does 
not contribute to the absorption of the positive oil shock by the real exchange rate, 
which instead takes place through changes in relative prices. Indeed, inflation in 
Russia has been much higher than in its main trading partner and the real 
exchange rate has been increasing in line with the real oil price (see figure 2 in 
section 2.1).  
 
Why has the real exchange rate of Norway been insulated by oil price 
shocks? Why are consumer prices not increasing in Saudi Arabia in spite of a 
depreciating nominal effective exchange rate since 2002 and a booming economy 
driven by the rise in oil prices? Why, instead, in Russia, has the real exchange rate 
been appreciating in line with rising oil prices? The exchange rate regime alone 
cannot help to answer these questions without considering the monetary policy 
reaction to oil shocks and the role of the public sector in “sterilising” the impact 
of rising oil prices on the domestic economy, in particular, through the 
accumulation of oil revenues in sovereign wealth funds and foreign assets. Other 
country-specific institutional features may also matter. 
 
Differently from the oil shocks of the 1970s, in the last decade oil 
producing countries raised domestic public saving and increased the pace of 
accumulation of net foreign assets, setting up in many cases separate sovereign 
wealth funds to manage these foreign assets
29. In this way, the authorities aimed at 
spreading the benefits of volatile oil revenues through time and different 
                                                 
29 An analysis of the different macroeconomic responses of these economies to the oil shocks of 
the 1970s and the most recent one goes beyond the scope of this paper. For more details see for 

















Figure 3. Nominal effective exchange rates in Norway, Russia and Saudi Arabia 
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generations. To the extent that oil revenues are invested abroad, that they are not 
converted in domestic currency and do not reflect a readily available increase in 
the wealth of the current generations, the impact of higher oil prices on the 
domestic economy and on the real exchange rate may remain muted
30. A closer 
look at the behaviour of the net foreign assets of the monetary authorities and their 
impact on monetary growth in our three countries shows that the “sterilisation” of 
oil revenues may indeed represent a potential explanation of the lack of reaction 
in the real exchange rate of Norway and Saudi Arabia to the recent upsurge in oil 
prices. 
 
Net foreign assets and base money in Norway, Russia, and Saudi Arabia 
are reported in Table 7. The net foreign assets of the Norges Bank are 
consolidated with the assets of the Global Pension Fund – former Global 
Petroleum Fund - which was set up at the beginning of the 1990s and started to 
accumulate the proceeds of oil revenues since 1996. The balance sheet of the 
Central Bank of Russia also included – at least until 2006 – the foreign assets of 
the Oil Stabilisation Fund, which started in 2004. In Saudi Arabia, there is no 
separate wealth fund and the proceeds of higher oil revenues show up among the 
assets of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. In the balance sheets of the various 
monetary authorities, these foreign assets are wholly or partly matched by 




Focussing in particular on the developments since the mid-1990s, which 
encompass the largest oil price shock in our sample, Table 7 reveals that “high-
powered” monetary growth in Norway has not been affected by higher oil prices, 
whereas the net foreign assets of Norwegian monetary authorities surged to 
almost 100 percent of GDP in 2006 – most of it accounted by the assets of the 
Global Pension Fund – almost 26 times larger than base money. It is therefore no 
surprise that higher oil prices in Norway do not have an impact on domestic prices 
and the Norges Banks has been able to achieve its inflation target. As the nominal 
exchange rate does not seem to have incorporated expectations of further 
appreciation, the real exchange rate does not co-move with the real oil price
32. 
                                                 
30 In the literature, net foreign assets are included among the potential determinants of real 
exchange rates (see for instance Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). There are however two sets of 
problems with the inclusion of this variable in our investigation: an empirical and a theoretical 
one. First, the inclusion of net foreign assets as an explanatory variable in time-series models of 
the real exchange rate is often not very robust, since the former variable moves slowly and is less 
volatile than real exchange rates. In technical terms, net foreign assets are often I(2) variables, 
which should be regressed with I(0) or I(1) variables. In addition, we could not get a complete 
dataset of quarterly data for this variable. Second, in the case of oil exporting countries, where 
those net foreign assets are managed and largely sterilised by the public sector, the wealth effect 
that should lead to an increase in the real exchange rate is weak or absent, unless one would 
assume perfect Ricardian behaviour of private agents.  
31 Usually, the term “sterilisation” refers to open market operations in domestic bonds or the 
issuance of central bank bills to mop up the excess liquidity in the markets resulting from the 
increase in foreign exchange reserves. However, in our three countries, this is not the case and 
larger net foreign assets are mainly “sterilised” by increasing government deposits at the central 
bank. 
32 As noted in section 3.1, differential in real interest rates vis-à-vis Norway’s main trading 
partners seem to matter in the short run during the flexible exchange rate period, in particular 
explaining the temporary nominal appreciation of the krone since 2000.  
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Table 7. Net foreign assets of the monetary authorities (NFA) and base money 
1980 1990 1995 2000 2006 1980-89 1990-99 2000-06
Norway
 1)
NFA (incl. GPF) 9.2 11.5 14.1 37.4 94.4 12.6 17.8 24.2
Base money 7.3 4.6 4.9 4.7 3.7 4.6 10.5 1.9
NFA to money (ratio) (1.3) (2.5) (2.9) (7.9) (25.8) ---
Russia 
2)
NFA - - 3.5 7.1 29.9 - na
3) 57.8
Base money - - 9.0 10.0 15.4 - 35.6
4) 33.5
NFA to money (ratio) -- (0.4) (0.7) (1.9) ---
Saudi Arabia
 5)
FA 52.8 48.5 32.6 26.0 64.5 -2.6 -4.0 28.9
Base money 6.3 12.0 10.3 9.7 8.5 2.2 3.4 8.4
FA to money (ratio) (8.4) (4.0) (3.2) (2.7) (7.6) ---
% of GDP (unless otherwise indicated) Average annual % growth rate    
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and Norges Bank. Notes. 
1) Net foreign assets of the monetary 
authorities including the Global Pension Fund (GPF) - former Global Petroleum Fund - which is managed by 
the Norges Bank and included as a separate item in the Bank's balance sheet. As of 2006, the foreign assets of 
the GPF amounted to USD 285 billion or 79 percent of GDP and were matched by krone deposits at the 
Norges Bank. 
2) The net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Russia include the assets of the Oil Stabilisation 
Fund which has been created in 2004. Until 2006 the rouble denominated counterpart of the foreign assets of 
the Fund were deposited by the Ministry of Finance in an unremunerated account at the Central Bank of 
Russia. 
3) In both 1998 and 1999, the Central Bank of Russia recorded negative net foreign assets as a 
consequence of the financial crisis. This prevents the calculation of a meaningful growth rate up to 1999. 
4) 
Starting from 1995. 
5) Foreign assets of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 
 
Similar to the case of Norway, in Saudi Arabia the net foreign assets of the 
monetary authorities surged from 26 percent of GDP in 2000 to 65 percent of 
GDP in 2006 and from three times the size of base money to almost eight times 
over the same period. Reserve money does not seem to have been fully 
“insulated” as monetary growth accelerated from an average annual rate of 4 
percent in the 1990s to around 8 percent since 2000, without having any major 
impact on domestic inflation so far. The explanation of these subdued inflationary 
pressures rests on the peculiar institutional features of the Saudi economy, which 
is characterised by a very flexible labour market, a very elastic labour supply 
curve, owing to the inflow of migrant workers, and by regulated and subsidised 
prices preventing the consume price index from increasing.  
 
Finally, as already noted, since 1999 the real exchange rate appreciation of 
the Russian rouble took place mainly through an increase in domestic prices and 
not through nominal appreciation. This was mainly due to the interventions of the 
Russian monetary authorities in the foreign exchange market, which led to a surge 
in net foreign assets from 7 percent of GDP in 2000 to 30 percent of GDP in 2006. 
These interventions have been only partially sterilised, leading to a strong 
expansion of domestic money supply, which increased at an average annual rate 
of more than 30 percent, in turn contributing to persistent inflationary pressures
33. 
                                                 
33 After the financial crisis, in Russia, inflation declined from more than 20 percent in 2000 to 
around 10 percent in 2006, remaining above the level of its main trading partner. It should be 
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Summing up, different exchange rate regimes may not help in explaining 
whether or not the relationship between the real oil price and the real exchange 
rate holds in practice. Irrespective of the exchange rate regimes, other factors may 
interfere and neutralise the transmission of shocks to the real exchange rate. These 
include specific policy responses to volatile oil revenues, monetary policy 
interventions which modify the specific combination of changes in relative prices 
and the nominal exchange rate which are necessary to restore the equilibrium and 
other institutional features.  In the case of Norway, the exchange rate regime 
underwent a number of modifications, with full exchange rate flexibility being 
introduced only over the last few years, thus complicating any possible 
interpretation of the impact of these regimes over the long-run. At the same time, 
over the past decade, Norway “sterilised” the impact of higher oil revenues on the 
domestic economy and the real exchange rate through the massive accumulation 
of net foreign assets. In Russia, instead, the oil shock has been transmitted to the 
real exchange rate through a partial sterilisation of oil revenues and an adjustment 
in price levels. In Saudi Arabia, the “sterilisation” of oil revenues, as well as the 
presence of flexible labour markets and price subsidies, may have played an 






In this paper we studied the real effective exchange rates of three oil exporting 
countries: Norway, Russia and Saudi Arabia. In particular, we investigated 
whether the real exchange rate reacts to movements in the real price of oil. In 
addition, we controlled for the possible role of productivity differentials against 
15 OECD trading partners in explaining exchange rate fluctuations. We find that 
the Russian rouble can be defined as an “oil currency”, since the real effective 
exchange rate seems to share a common stochastic trend with the real oil price. 
This relationship is robust to the inclusion of the productivity differential as an 
explanatory variable, which appears to be an important determinant of the real 
exchange rate in Russia, a transition economy. Due to the relatively short sample 
for Russia, it is necessary to take this conclusion with some caution and possibly 
test it again over a longer time-span in the future. On the contrary, we find no – or 
at best a very marginal – impact of the real oil price on the real exchange rates of 
Norway and Saudi Arabia.  In general, there is not sufficient evidence to maintain 
that the diverse exchange rate regimes of these countries may account for the 
different empirical results on the impact of oil prices. However, different policy 
responses to volatile oil revenues – such as the accumulation of net foreign assets 
and their sterilisation – and specific institutional characteristics may account for 
the different behaviour of the real exchange rate and interactions of changes in 
relative prices and nominal exchange rates in these countries.        
                                                                                                                                      
noted that part of the monetary growth accommodated the rising demand for roubles as the 
Russian economy went through a process of de-dollarisation.  
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Appendix A. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this appendix we sketch the theoretical framework underlying our empirical 
investigation. The model determines the real exchange rate to be a function of 
terms of trade and relative productivity between the non-traded and traded sectors 
of trading partners. The model is a standard small open economy adopted from 
Cashin et al. (2004).  
 
  We consider a small open economy, O, which is composed of two 
different sectors: the one associated with the production of a primary commodity 
as an export tradable good, and the other producing a non-traded good. This 
country trades the domestic commodity production with the rest of the world 
against imports of final manufactured goods. Since crude oil is the primary 
commodity of interest in this work, we keep to the wording “oil”, “crude oil” and 
“petroleum”, henceforth. Firms in both sectors work in a perfect competitive 
environment and have access to constant returns to scale technology. Labour is 
fully mobile and the only input factor for both traded and non-traded goods. As a 
result, wages are equalized across sectors. Households supply labour inelastically 
and derive utility from the consumption of the non-traded good produced at home 
and the imported good. Consequently, we describe algebraically the oil exporter’s 
economy and the rest of the world so that, eventually, we can define the real 
exchange rate of the oil producing country. To focus on the long-run factors 
behind real exchange rate movements, a simple static framework is adopted.     
 
A.1. The oil producing country 
  In this subsection we describe the supply and demand sides of the 
economy of the oil exporter.  
A.1.1. Firms 
As mentioned above, the economy consists of two sectors: the one 
producing crude oil and the other which consists of a continuum of firms 
producing a non-traded good. Since the representative firm in both sectors 








L w Y P
O
i
− = Π max , 






i L Y α = , 
where index i can take the notation of either N (non-tradable sector) or X (export 
tradable sector), 
O
X L  is the amount of labour demanded in the petroleum sector, 
and 
O




i Y P , where 
O
i Y  stands for output, net of labour costs 
O
i





i L α ; 
O
i α  captures the labour productivity in the production of good 
i. Crucially, due to free labour movement, wages (
O w ) are equalized across 
sectors. Profit optimization in the non-tradable and tradable sectors yields the 
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X w P α = , respectively, where 
O
N P  
is the price of the non-tradable good and 
O
X P  the nominal price of crude oil.  
Since in equilibrium the marginal productivity of labour must equal the 
real wage in each sector, and under the assumption of exogeneity of the nominal 









= .                        (1) 
Thus, productivity differential between the export and non-traded sector of the 





N P P ). Hence, an increase in the price of oil will raise the wage in that 
sector leading to a rise in the wage and price level of the non-traded sector. 
A.1.2. Households     
   A continuum of identical households maximise their utility over the 
consumption of the non-traded good produced domestically and the imported 
tradable good. The petroleum good is consumed exclusively abroad. Furthermore, 





O L L L + = ). Thus, the representative 
household is characterised by Cobb-Douglas preferences and solves the following 
utility problem under the wealth constraint: 


























N = + , 
where 
O
N C  is consumption in country O of domestic non-tradables, ( )
O
T C  – of 










O C C C  is an aggregate of 
O
N C  and ( )
O
T C  with 
()







being a constant. The household is assumed to cover its expenses by utilising its 
total wealth W. The consumer price index of the oil producing country, which is 
obtained by solving the optimization problem above, is a geometric average, with 








O P P P ,                       (2) 
where  ( )
O
T P  is the price in local currency of one unit of the tradable good 
imported from a foreign region D, which will be discussed in the next subsection. 
Under the assumption that the law of one price holds for tradables and, hence, for 




T = . Here, we define E to be the nominal 
exchange rate expressing country D’s currency for one unit of country O’s 
currency; ( )
D
T P  is the price of tradable goods in region D. 
 
A.2. Foreign region 
  In the last subsection we showed that households in the oil producing 
country consume beside the domestic non-traded good a traded good imported 
from abroad. At the same time, total production of crude oil is exported and 
utilized exclusively abroad. Here, we will present the foreign region. 
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A.2.1. Foreign firms 
The economy of the foreign region D consists of three sectors: non-traded 
(N) and traded sectors (T), and a third one (I) producing an intermediate good. 
Labour is the only input in the production of the intermediate and non-traded 
goods; the technology for their production is given by 
D DD
II I YL α =  and 
D DD
NN N YL α = , respectively. Moreover, the non-traded good is consumed only in the 
foreign region. Thus, the profit maximization problems of the firms in the non-
traded and intermediate good sectors are identical with the optimization problems 
of the firms in the oil producing country. The first order conditions yield for the 


















= . Similarly, as in the oil exporting 
country, due to wage equalisation across sectors, we can express the price of non-








= .                       (3) 
The firms producing the final traded good involve two production factors 
in the manufacturing process. The first is crude oil imported from several oil 
producing countries, including country O. The second is an intermediate good. 
The foreign firms produce the final traded good ( )
D
T Y  by assembling the foreign 
intermediate input ( )
D
I Y  and the petroleum good ( )
D
X Y . Eventually, their profit 




















+ − = Π
,
max , 










T Y Y Y , 
where 
()




 is a constant. The solution to the problem yields the cost 
of a unit of the tradable good, expressed in terms of the foreign currency, as a 









T P P P .  
A.2.2. Foreign households 
Consumers in the foreign country are assumed to consume their nontraded 
good and this final good in the same fashion as consumers in the oil exporting 
country. Labour market arrangements are the same and, therefore, the consumer 








D P P P .                                (4) 
 
A.3. Real exchange rate determination 
The discussion of the domestic economy (i.e. of the oil producing country) 
and the foreign region was necessary so that we can show now how the real 
exchange rate is determined for the oil exporter. We define the real exchange rate 
of the oil producing economy as the foreign price of the oil exporting country’s 
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basket of consumption (
O EP ) relative to the foreign region’s price of the 
consumption basket of the latter (
D P ): 
D O P EP .  E denotes the nominal 
exchange rate of country O expressed as the number of foreign currency units per 
domestic currency unit. Thus, an increase in E means that the domestic currency 
appreciates, since one should pay a larger number of foreign currency units to get 
just one domestic currency unit. Using equations (1) to (4) we can determine the 
































,                     (5) 
where the last term (
D D
XI PP ) – the relative price of crude oil exports in terms of 
imports expressed in the foreign country currency – denotes terms of trade of the 
oil exporting country O. Algebraically, an increase in terms of trade will lead to 
real currency appreciation. The two productivity differentials, i.e. the first two 
ratios, can account for the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which implies that the 
domestic currency will experience real appreciation if its productivity-growth 
advantage in tradables exceeds its productivity growth advantage in non-tradables 
against its trading partners. 








Appendix B.  
 
Real effective exchange rate in Norway. Ordinary least squares 
Full sample Fixed rate Floating rate
REER (-1)  0.815***  0.762** 0.731***
[0.060] [0.097] [0.086]
D(Real oil price)  0.024 0.014 0.038
[0.016] [0.020] [0.025]
D(Productivity) -0.242 -0.295 0.019
[0.016] [0.255] [0.258]
Real int. rate differential (-1) -0.0000 -0.002 0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
const. 0.867*** 1.117** 1.249***
[0.279] [0.455] [0.398]
Adj. R-sq 0.64 0.54 0.64
No. obs. 106 52 54
Sample period 1980q1-2006q2 1980q1-1992q4 1993q1-2006q2
Notes: All variables are in logs except for the real interest rate differential. The dependent variable is the real 
effective exchange rate of Norway. Explanatory variables include the real oil price (in first differences) the 
productivity differential vis-à-vis the main 15 OECD trading partners (in first differences) and the first lag of 
the real interest rate differential (in level) vis-à-vis the same OECD trading partners. Interest rates are long 
term government bond yields from IMF IFS (line 61) deflated by CPI inflation. Asterisks ***, **, and * 
denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percentage levels. All results are robust to the usual misspecification tests 
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Appendix C. Data 
 
Trade Weights 
( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )
1980-1984 2001-2005 1995-1999 2001-2005 1980-1984 2001-2005
Australia 0.40 0.19 0.11 0.09 1.38 1.57
Canada 1.21 3.58 0.31 0.26 0.84 0.73
Denmark 4.91 5.13 0.59 0.56 0.27 0.20
Finland 2.81 2.47 3.32 3.25 0.39 0.22
France 3.09 8.22 2.33 2.80 7.23 3.59
Germany 16.41 12.34 9.76 10.12 5.42 3.36
Italy 1.98 2.95 4.35 6.15 6.13 3.05
Japan 2.96 2.19 2.84 2.47 21.57 13.48
Korea 0.65 0.86 1.10 1.36 2.45 7.88
Netherlands 4.67 8.06 3.96 5.08 3.82 2.82
Spain 0.58 1.85 0.68 1.08 2.39 1.71
Sweden 12.93 10.58 1.23 1.47 1.14 0.69
Switzerland 1.09 0.67 3.42 3.05 0.81 0.76
United Kingdom 26.22 15.94 3.38 3.46 3.91 3.11
USA 6.22 7.48 7.49 6.29 13.91 16.90
% of total trade 86.12 82.52 44.85 47.51 71.67 60.07
Norway Russia Saudi Arabia
 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report trade volumes between Norway and each of its 15 OECD trading partners as 
a ratio of Norwegian overall trade with the world. Columns (3) and (4) and columns (5) and (6) do the same 
for Russia and Saudi Arabia, correspondingly. All values are created as arithmetic averages of five consequent 
years. The last line in the table summarizes the ratio of trade with the 15 OECD partners to total trade of 
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